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BOOK REVIEWS
TAXES. Symposium conducted by the Tax Institute,
November 20-21, 1958. Princeton: Tax Institute, Incorporated, 1959.
Pp. viii, 248. $6.00.

DEPRECIATION AND

The federal government imposes a tax upon the net income of
business corporations; one of the deductions allowable in computing
this net income is that for the depreciation on certain physical assets;
a framework of rules for the computation of this depreciation deduction has been established by the Congress and the Internal Revenue Service. Whether or not the goals of public policy call for an
overhauling of this framework is the general topic under discussion in
Depreciation and Taxes, a collection of papers presented at a symposium conducted by the Tax Institute at Princeton. Essays composed
by accountants, businessmen, government administrators, economists,
and tax attorneys may be expected to bring forth a broad crosssection of arguments from differing points of view and this volume
is not an exception. It is also to be expected that such a group of
papers will afford a wide variation in logical consistency, clarity of
exposition, and relevance to the subject at hand; here again the reader
is not to be disappointed.
Before looking at the pros and cons of various positions, it might
be useful to have a general knowledge of the types of changes which
have already been proposed; unfortunately, accountant Albert H.
Cohen's commendable discussion of "Proposals for Depreciation Reform" appears nearer to the back cover of Depreciation and Taxes
than to the front. There have been, says Cohen, two basic types of
recommended alteration, each having a different purpose. On the
one hand, some proposals for depreciation reform have been designed
to take account of changes in price levels. One method of dealing
with this phenomenon would be to allow historical cost depreciation
dollars to be expressed on a current dollar basis; another might be to
convert total accumulated depreciation into current dollars. A third
possibility, one which has been presented to this year's session of
Congress in the Keogh bill, is known as "reinvestment depreciation":
in the year in which an asset is retired, "the difference between the
original cost of the asset at the time it was acquired and the original
cost adjusted with the current price index would be available to the
taxpayer as a deduction . . . as long as the taxpayer made capital
expenditures in that year at least equal to the sum of the original
cost of the asset retired plus the inflation that had occurred in the
1312
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dollars of its cost since its acquisition."'
On the other hand, some proposals have aimed at changing the
present structure of depreciation, that is, at altering the pattern in
which depreciation may be deducted or the time period over which
assets may be depreciated. One such proposal was the amendment to
the tax laws effected in 1954, making declining balance and sum-ofthe-years'- digits methods applicable for tax purposes. Other recommendations have dealt with the "useful life" concept: should the
Internal Revenue Service's "outmoded" Bulletin F be revised, as
some would argue, or should there be somewhat more flexibility at
the taxpayer's option, as others have suggested? Still other proposals
have dealt with the calculation of salvage value, some claiming that it
should be changed from time to time to meet differing market conditions, others maintaining that salvage values should not be changed
capriciously.
Harvey Perry, Director of the Canadian Tax Foundation, discusses
briefly some of the depreciation practices engaged in by Canada,
Great Britain, Sweden, and West Germany. He concludes that recent
years have seen much use of depreciation policy as a means of influencing investment, that these measures have been sometimes
designed to discourage instead of to stimulate investment, and that
shorter write-off periods and higher depreciation rates have been
common elements of most measures.
These, in general, are the changes in the computation of the depreciation deduction which have been proposed in the past, some of
which have been effected by other nations. Passing to the question of
which, if any, of these changes should be effected in the future, we
run into a decided difference of opinion among the various occupations
represented.
Most skeptical are the economists. As E. Cary Brown views the
problem, two basic reasons for having a depreciation allowance for
tax purposes may be discerned. One is to achieve a more fair distribution of tax burdens and incomes; here a sharp line should be
drawn between the treatment of depreciable assets of corporations
and those of proprietorships and partnerships since the two groups are
subject to different types of income tax. A change in depreciation
policy would bring about a relatively small shifting of burden in the
corporate field since almost all firms would be affected, but a comparatively great shifting would occur in the non-corporate sector,
since only a small portion of those paying the personal income tax
would be affected by the change. The second reason for allowing
depreciation is to achieve desired economic effects, such as the pur-
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chase of defense facilities or the stimulation of total demand for
plant and machinery. Such effects have been and may be achieved,
but Professor Brown would urge that several caveats be considered
before attempting economic manipulation through depreciation policy.
Economist William F. Hellmuth, Jr., considers some of the problems which would arise from the use of replacement cost depreciation.
Distribution of income would be affected in such a way that the
position of owners of depreciable assets would be protected against
inflation while that of the owners of other assets would not; this
would be inequitable, since businessmen are already better able to
offset inflationary effects (by raising prices) than are other taxpayers.
The economy would be made less stable insofar as adjustment for
price level changes encouraged investment during inflation and discouraged it when the dollar was gaining in value. Although the rate
of economic growth would be stimulated, alternate methods might be
more selective as to quality of investment. More resources would
shift into new plant and equipment, but the accompanying increase
in the proportion of internal to external funds might give existing
and larger firms an advantage over new and smaller enterprises.
One essay, while not pleading either for or against changes in depreciation policy, presents an analysis which seems to point in the
direction of a more liberal policy. In discussing depreciation as an
element in investment decisions, George Terborgh concludes that more
rapid allowances for depreciation increase the incentive to invest by
enlarging the available supply of funds, enhancing the attractiveness
of investment projects, increasing the rate of return, and lowering the
operating advantage required to justify investment. By offering
several ways in which rapid depreciation increases the inducement to
invest, Terborgh presents ammunition for the guns of those favoring
larger depreciation deductions.
Investment decisions are actually made by management; in making
these decisions it is not always the real pros and cons which are
weighed. In discussing the advantages and disadvantages to his firm
of adopting the new depreciation methods authorized in 1954, Thomas
M. McDade, Controller of General Foods, indicates that Terborgh's
reasoning was not acted upon. While recognizing that the advantage
of accelerated depreciation lies in making more cash available, McDade feels that the adoption of these new methods would be disadvantageous in that they would cause net earnings to be lower.
Apparently it doesn't matter whether the difference in net earnings
is real or not.
At least three of the participants advocate the adjustment of depreciation allowances to compensate for changes in the level of
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prices. All take this position for the same reason: Brown's first reason
for the allowance of depreciation, the more fair distribution of tax
burdens and incomes, or, more explicitly, the avoidance of "capital
erosion." In describing "phantom profits," accountant Leonard Spacek
states that: "[t]he understatement of depreciation results in a material over-statement of profits for most corporations that have substantial amounts of property."2 Karl H. Rudolph of the Cleveland
Electric Illuminating Company claims that "[u]tilities and unregulated industry alike must gain tax recognition of economic depreciation to eliminate the present tax levy on capital." 3 In establishing
priorities in tax reform, Chrysler's Frank V. Olds concludes that:
"[t]he top urgency, the number one priority in any list of industrial
tax reforms, is the elimination of capital erosion .... 14 The argument
here is that, in an inflationary period, depreciation deducted on an
historical cost basis will generally be less than the real capital costs
incurred, that stated profit will therefore be greater than real profit
and that capital is thus eroded to the extent of the tax on this difference.
Although in light of the arguments of Professors Brown and Hellmuth it is doubtful that adjusting depreciation for price level changes
would result in a more equitable distribution of tax burdens, the
conclusion that capital has been eroded because of "inadequate"
depreciation allowances may not be incorrect. However, the logic
utilized to support this contention is incomplete. Here is the most
significant weakness of Depreciation and Taxes: the omission of a
discussion of the mechanics of depreciation. Several variables are
involved in determining the "adequacy" of depreciation, i.e., the
equality of capital cost and depreciation allowance in real terms: the
rate of inflation, the rate of growth of a firm's depreciable assets, the
time-span over which an asset is depreciated, the pattern in which the
asset is depreciated over this period, and the actual pattern of loss
of capital value. It is the inter-action of all these variables which
ultimately determines depreciation "adequacy." It is entirely possible,
for instance, for depreciation taken on an historical cost basis to
exceed loss in capital value even when the economy is experiencing
a period of inflation; this will take place (assuming the pattern of
depreciation allowances to conform to reality) when a firm expands
its stock of depreciable assets at a rate faster than that at which the
value of the dollar is declining. The fact- is that we do not know
whether or not American industry has been the victim of "capital
erosion" because of inadequate depreciation allowances. Since 1940
2. Id. at 76.
3. Id. at 83.
4. Id. at 243.
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the value of the dollar has fallen almost without interruption, a
phenomenon which would cause depreciation allowances to be less
than sufficient to pay for used-up capital, other things being equal.
But during this same period, the economy has been expanding and
the stock of depreciable assets increasing; this development would
tend to cause such allowances to be greater than the value of the
capital consumed. Which force has been the stronger has yet to be
determined.
The remaining papers do not deal directly with the problem of
depreciation tax policy. Princeton's Paul J. Strayer issues a plea to
political leaders to prevent inflation. Joel Barlow writes of management compensation policies, indicating that there may be an incentive for a few managers to take as little depreciation as possible
so as to increase paper profits, thus justifying salary increases and
increasing the value of stock options. Darrell S. Parker and Russell
C. Harrington discuss, respectively, depreciation policy and administration problems of the Internal Revenue Service; Brady 0. Bryson
explores the relation of depreciation to capital gains. Finally, John
A. Gosnell of the National Small Business Men's Association establishes priorities in tax reform, and we learn that "business, in the
broad sense of that term, pays the way for government, labor, education, religion, and all other activity . .

."

and that therefore the

highest priority in tax reform, next to "survival," is "the acceptance
of leadership by the business community." 6
JoHN F. BowEN*

PLANNING FOR FREEDOM;

THE

PUBLIc LAW OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM.

By Eugene V. Rostow. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959.
Pp. x, 437. $6.00.
This book has an appealing and provocative title, a distinguished
and brilliant author, and a meaty content. I may perhaps be charged
with being a prejudiced witness in its cause, since I have always
been an "institutional" economist, and Dean Rostow deals with the
functioning of our economy as mediated by the institution of public
law. I may be biased in his favor also by the fact that he views the
Employment Act of 1946 as "one of the most important statutes of
this generation," reflecting a new type of professional and lay
5. Id. at 231.
6. Id. at 233.
* Earhart Fellow in Economics, Vanderbilt University.
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economic thinking about public responsibility and private sophistication and discipline, and I too have been said to hold an "exalted"
view of the Employment Act. Certainly my involvement in the early
years of its implementation (and observations and ponderings since)
have led me to concur in Rostow's belief that the institution of our
public law can-assuming economic enlightenment and cooperativeness on both the public and the private side-resolve the potential
conflict between the act's major goals-maximum sustained production and the maintenance of "free competitive enterprise."
Thus, with only such differences in detail as are to be expected
(and are useful) among scholars, I would endorse Planning for Freedom as a sound and deeply perceptive treatment of issues that are
crucial for the future success of our "American way" of economic
life. Though the author does not shirk difficult technicalities of both
law and economic theory, his exposition is laudably free of professional jargon and obscurantism. He writes clearly and vigorously
for "that mythical creature, the liberally educated man" and at the
same time goes far toward improving communication between lawyers
and economists-and studious businessmen as well.
Dean Rostow views the law as one of the social sciences or, as
he aptly re-titles that broad field, "the professions of social action."
As such, it "can never escape the necessity for reaching conclusions
about values. . . .The professions of social action are dedicated to
improving human and social welfare, just as the health professions
are dedicated to improving human health. . . . Their daily work
presupposes a concept of society as a living organism-some sense of
its shape, an idea as to the connections among its separate parts, and a
choice among its values, its ends, and its modes of change." "The
Economic Order As a Problem of Law" (title of chapter 1) is too
generally conceived as "rather apologetically defending the capitalism
of William McKinley." This outmoded definition should be replaced
by "a mature product of this generation ....[using in its formulation]
the best of modern learning in all the behavioral sciences from
anthropology to econometrics. Above all, it should be animated by a
theory of human freedom specifically addressed to the circumstances
of contemporary life."1
With such a concept of society as a living organism with interrelated structures and interrelated functions, it is but natural that
"The Economic Order As a System of Law" (chapter 2) should stress
the systemic relationships within the mass of statutes and administrative orders that make up the totality of "the law." Law is the
expression of public policy, and this policy, when directed toward
1. ROSTOW, PLANNING FOR FREEoM; THE PUBLIc LAW OF AmERIcAN CAPITAL-

ism 7 (1959).
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economic affairs, embraces "the dispositions of the law for directing,
stimulating, releasing, encouraging, repressing, or regulating the
2
economic proclivities of Americans."
This string of active verbs is well chosen to bring out the varied
purposes and impacts of the numerous statutes that we have found
it necessary or expedient over the years to enact for the betterment
of the national economic life. With a little change in order and some
grouping, they reflect the progress we have made from (a) rulemaking to promote orderliness and equity among private enterprisers;
to (b) measures to create incentive or afford guidance to the economic
proclivities of individuals or groups toward ends declared in response
to popular demand; and, finally, (c) to the positive or leadership role
of releasing, encouraging, and stimulating latent productive capacity
so that the economy shall add as much as possible "to the wealth of
a nation, and to the wealth of nations." This third disposition of the
law I have often referred to as the "facilitating" role of government
-our distinctive way of achieving maximum economic ends without
curtailing freedom by resorting to state socialism as the means. To
this third aspect of the law Planning for Freedom assigns a position
of primacy. That is, fiscal and monetary policy wield "the primary
tools of control" over the economic order (pt. II). Matters relating
to (a) and (b) above are dealt with more briefly as "Secondary Tools
of Control: Free and Regulated Markets" (pt. III).
Though thus distinguishable for analytical purposes into two main
branches, primary and secondary,
the law of the economy is, in the long view, a coherent whole. It is not
a jumble of unrelated and incompatible laws and practices. Today, as
was not the case twenty-five years ago, we have a viable economic system,
organized by an equally viable body of law. Together, they constitute an
appropriate economic foundation for the public life of a capitalist democracy.3

These four sentences state the theme, or are the germ, of the entire
book. They express an exalted concept of the law and a no less
flattering estimate of the quality of our economy. This stress on both
the law and the economy as organic or systemic in character is both
sound and much needed. But I believe it would have reflected Dean
Rostow's actual view more precisely if, in the quotation above, he
had said that our viable body of law is evolving toward the goal of
becoming a "coherent whole," rather than to assert that it has already done so. In fact, he intimated just that in a preceding paragraph: "When I urge that these patterns of action are taking form
as a system of law, I do not mean to imply that they are stiff with
2. Id. at 3.
3. Id. at 4.
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symmetry. Any living law contains anomalies." But important clarification of both ends and means was registered in the Employment
Act of 1946: "The three pre-existing bodies of law .. that governing
fiscal and monetary policy; that regulating the markets for products
are being drawn together into a
and services; and the labor law
new field of magnetic force by the influence of the Employment Act
of 1946, which is giving them new dimensions, a new orientation, and
a new momentum." 4 Its twin goals, maximum national production
and the fostering of our tradition of free enterprise, are accepted by
Dean Rostow as his frame of reference throughout the book.
Chapter 2, "The Economic Order as a System of Law," opens with
the sentence: "The first principle of the law for the control [sic] of
the economy is that the government is responsible for the general
level of employment." This is followed shortly by the introduction
of the Employment Act--"one of the most important statutes of this
generation"-as the middle way between devastating laissez faire
cycles, on the one hand, and socialism, on the other.
In their most general form, the questions with which this book deals are
whether the hypothesis of the Employment Act is realistic, and whether
its twin purposes-[maximum production over time and free competitive
enterprise]-are compatible .... Does government planning for full employment necessarily doom the institutions of private business and private
labor? If this approach to planning is feasible at all, under what concriteria should the planning powers of
ditions, and according to what
the government be exercised? 5
This surely is an excellent statement of the basic issue by which
our economic society is today confronted. To the first and second parts
of the query the book gives a broadly affirmative answer: the major
goal of the act-full employment-is realistic, and does not necessarily
entail the giving up of freedom. It does not "doom the institution of
private business and private labor" either by coercion of capital or of
labor to produce or by the straitjacketing of price, profit, or wage
setting or bargaining in order to prevent harmful inflation.
The third part of Rostow's enquiry concerns how this happy solution of our national dilemma is to be worked out. Before examining
the author's explanation of the means by which these ends are to be
attained, we should note the scope and limits of certain of the terms
used. (1) "Full employment" appears to signify high sustained
productive use of the nation's resources, natural, human, and financial.
It becomes practically synonomous (see chapters 6, 7) with amelioration of the business cycle to those moderate ups and downs
of business activity indigenous to a society of great technological
4. Id. at 368.
5. Id. at 13.
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dynamism and elastic credit institutions, manned by group executives
of varied professional competence and under a legal structure already
good but not foolproof. (2) The concept of freedom for which the
author stipulates is, of course, not anarchism or even the "rugged
individualism" cherished in nineteenth-century America; it is freedom
of consumer, worker, and investor choice, linked to the political freedom ingrained in our democratic system of popular choice of legislators to shape institutions and make policies and of executive officials
to administer them. The Employment Act leaves individuals and
households free to express their intelligence and scale of values in
the planning of their private affairs; leaves proprietors, corporate
executives, and union officials similarly free in shaping their polices
and prosecuting their programs. We have been getting a richer mixture of economic sophistication in the exercise of private freedom of
choice as general education for both youth and adults has progressed,
and it was only natural that this should express itself also in greater
planfulness in our public affairs. (3) "Planning" in the idiom of this
book means government planning (or "control" of the economic order
by the institution of the law). It was both defined and espoused in
the declaration of policy in the Employment Act in these terms
(which are now in process of operational interpretation): "It is the
continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government...
to coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and resources . . .
to promote maximum production, employment, and purchasing
power." Twenty-five years earlier we had moved from fiscal chaos to
a "National Budget and Accounting Act."
Full employment, freedom, and planning are all explicitly stated
goals of the Employment Act, but that law refrained from prescribing
means by which these ends are to be attained. In the 142 pages of
part II, Rostow, as economic theoretician, explains for lawyers, law
students, and other noneconomists the rationale of fiscal and monetary
policy as "the primary tools" for control [sic] of the economic order.
This exposition peaks up in a chapter which seems slightly ambiguous
(as between gyroscope and motor, between secular and cyclical roles)
on the "Gyroscope of Fiscal Policy" and a stimulating and useful
chapter on the "Interplay of Monetary and Fiscal Policy." But the
gist of these matters has earlier been previewed in chapter 2. In
portraying the economic order as a system of law, Rostow says:
Together, fiscal and monetary policy now constitute the first and decisive
tool of the law of economic planning. Its basic thesis is that the government and the Federal Reserve system should see to it that money is
being spent for goods and services of various kinds in a volume sufficient
to assure high levels of useful employment, without precipitating the
pressures of general inflation. Drawing on the improved modern analysis
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of national income, this policy relies on the hydraulic pressure of an
adequate level of spending to elicit the most valuable possible combination
of outputs from the economy at full employment.6
This is a somewhat extreme version of the "aggregate demand"
doctrine which has attained widespread vogue in recent years. That
government spending and the making available of bank reserves by
"the Fed" will operate directly and indirectly to enlarge employment
opportunities would not be denied by any economist or knowledgeable
business man. But that a precise amount of effective demand for
available kinds of labor could be thus created is at best dubious; and
that it would be so allocated as to mop up all the pools of frictional
and transitional unemployment strains credulity-to say nothing of
the supposition that this stimulant would "elicit the most valuable
possible combination of outputs from the economy at full employment"! That Dean Rostow is aware of all this is made clear in the
very next paragraph. Though still referring to fiscal and monetary
action as controls, he modulates his characterization of their impact
by saying that "within their limits they are vitally effective," and then
adds this admirable appraisal of their role:
By using them, the state can influence the environment in which business
makes its decisions. Recourse to such indirect controls alters the range
of possibilities the businessman faces, and makes certain courses of action
feasible or not, as the case may be.... So far as the businessman or the
labor leader is concerned, controls of this kind determine the opportunities
before him....

They do not change the degree of his freedom in the

him to ask anybody's permission before
conduct of his business or require
7
doing what he wants to do.
A second set of "tools for the control [sic] of the economic order"
is discussed in the 105 pages of part III, likewise in terms suitable for
the lawyer and other noneconomists. "The literature of economics as
a source of policy ... has been weakened by its failure to integrate
aggregative and market analysis." [Amen!] Such integration, in
Rostow's dialectic, starts with the firm assumption that federal fiscal
and monetary policies are capable of maintaining a level of national
production adequate for full employment, and assigns to the market
only the ancillary task of distributing this "hydraulic pressure" into
the proper channels.
[T]housands of businessmen, large and small . . . would react to the
prospect of profit by ... organizing production in response to consumer
[T]he principle of market compedemand or in anticipation of it ....

tition, policed by antitrust laws, is the most satisfactory of known
directing business activity within the private sector of the
methods for
8
economy.
6. Id. at 16.
7. Id. at 17.
8. Ibid.
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Where this competition does not exist or cannot be brought about,
market regulation must be skillfully planned and applied by government.
Consonant with this model of the economic order as a system of
law, Rostow shows a manifest distaste for any pretensions of "economic
statesmanship" on the part of oligopolistic management or industrywide unions and labor federations-any voluntary restraint in prices
or wages in the interest of a more productive and stable economic
order. He seems to accept maximization of gain for the organized
group (in unstated time reference) as the only practicable or theoretically correct rule of action. Legal deterrence and punishment
are realistic; private responsibility for the broader consequences to
the system from the exercise of necessarily concentrated market
power is, it seems, sentimental.
Since the labor market differs in important ways from the market
for goods 'and public services, the law has for some years been fashioning distinctive tools for controlling wage bargaining, conditions of
work, and union structures and practices. Antitrust laws have not
been applied by the courts and, apparently, in Rostow's judgment
have no applicability.
The purpose of collective bargaining is to allow workers to combine,
and to assert a considerable degree of monopoly power, by strike or otherwise, in influencing their own wages ....That policy is justified as an act
of law designed to redress the unequal bargaining position of the individual worker and his employer .... [I]t is sound policy still.... I
believe the broad outlines of the present law are generally sound with
one exception .... [Union officials [in their handling of union funds]
should be within the reach of the law as firmly as officers of banks or
business corporations. 9
It may not be altogether clear to some readers how the case of
labor law is to be so sharply distinguished from corporation law,
where individual capitalists are permitted to exert a considerable
degree of market power through collective action but subject to
unequivocal restraints upon monopoly or serious restraint of trade.
Are David MacDonald and James R. Hoffa individuals seeking redress
against employers of disproportionate bargaining power? Or are the
$10,000 to $25,000 airline pilots or milk route drivers underdogs in the
labor market? It may have timely interest to note that the Supreme
Court in a very recent decision (U. S. v. Maryland & Virginia Milk
Producers Ass'n) ruled that the collective bargaining of a farmers'
cooperative does not have immunity from antitrust laws. Such immunity had been claimed under section 6 of the Clayton Act, which
bracketed agricultural associations with labor unions as not "forbidden
9. Id. at 3,14-15.
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or restrained.., by the antitrust laws... from lawfully carrying out
the legitimate objects thereof."
The Congress has done something to spell out legitimate ends and
lawful means for farmers in the Capper-Volstead Act, and for labor
in the Taft-Hartley and Kennedy-Griffin Acts. But these and many
other special statutes applying to industrial, commercial, and financial
business fall far short of giving us an adequate and consistent system
of law for our varied market situations. Dean Rostow makes this
point in particular reference to our declared intention to maintain
full employment, national growth, and dollar stability. He concludes
that:
[Ojur present law for the control of free markets, regulated industries,
and labor [is not very adequate] in the light of the several purposes of
the Employment Act. All these bodies of law need amendment or
reinterpretation, to a greater or lesser degree, before they can be expected to complement fiscal and monetary policy in helping to keep a
growing economy fully employed at prices that are approximately stable
over long periods of time.10
Beyond this, the successful operation of this fiscal and market
apparatus obviously requires technical economic understanding and
genuine concern for national needs on the part of many policymaking or policy-implementing leaders, public and quasipublic. While
Rostow presents a rather complacent estimate of the apparatus itself,
he takes (in part IV) a somewhat dim view of the performance of its
working crew since World War II.
[T]hree booms ... ground to a halt in 1948, 1953, and 1956 or 1957 ....
From the middle of 1956 or thereabouts there was a period virtually without growth ....
The failure of the gross national product in constant
prices to rise at least 3 per cent a year is in itself a dangerous signal....
The Federal Reserve was slow to start, and hesitant. The government
fought hard to prevent recourse to the weapon of tax cuts which had
proved so effective in 1949 and 1954.... It is a matter of high concern that
full employment be restored reasonably soon ....
W]e owe it to ourselves not to have recessions. . . . [O]ur policy should be not only to
restore full employment but to increase the growth rate of the economy
if we are to conquer poverty at home and provide the government with
the wherewithal of its diplomacy."
Having "synthesized" his doctrine in part I, analyzed its modus
operandiin parts II and III, and applied it empirically to the economic
history of the United States since World War II in part IV, Dean
Rostow concludes his book with a brief critical appraisal of "Where
We Are Now." As for "The Goals of Legal Action for Controlling
the Economy" (chapter 14) he holds that "the law should seek more,
10. Id. at 213.
11. Id. at 352.
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much more, than full employment .... If it is true to itself, it should
define its goals in terms which transcend the limits of economics
12
and draw their strength from a wider range of aspirations."
These extra-economic criteria include "ideals of equality, responsibility, and justice, in the relation of man to man and in the relation
of men to the state. These standards may be expressed, for our
society, as the ideal of human freedom-to achieve and perfect the
freedom of man within a just society, and to permit and encourage his
13
personal development as a mature, civilized, and responsible being."
We have all along practiced a legal blend of personal freedom and
"the coercion of collective decision, asserted in accordance with the
established and appropriate modes of law." The Employment Act is
good law because it makes articulate what has long and increasingly
been The Spirit of the Law a la the U.S.A.
Only time, "trade cycle by trade cycle," will tell whether this act,
as we work it out in practice, is consistent with the fundamental
principle of our jurisprudence--"that of preventing a concentration of
authority so formidable as to imperil the economic and social basis
of freedom." But as for Eugene Rostow, the answer is
a categorical 'yes'. Government programs to regulate the relationship
between the flow of funds and the flow of goods in a market economy do
not require any change in the prevailing pattern of power distribution.
... There is no imperative in the theory of such policies which would
require programs for sustaining high levels of employment to become
engines of collectivism .... [but] if well conducted, should fortify, not
weaken, the health, vigor, and autonomy of the free institutions of business and labor.
[T]he criterion of stable prices is the most workable of possible
legislative limitations on the discretion of government in carrying out
the policies of the Employment Act.14
An arresting last chapter carries the almost startling title "Is Freedom Interesting Enough?" Specifically, "is a full-employment, competitive society the highest aspiration our culture can produce? Does
the acceptance of such a goal condemn us to a hopeless commercialism
in values?" Not in Dean Rostow's philosophy. The socialist jibe that
capitalism is "based on the selfish premise of individualism" loses its
point in a people's capitalism. Individuals are spurred to diligence
in order to maintain or raise current consumption, spurred to thrift
in the interest of future security and risk-taking in the interest of
technological and commercial progress, and to a social ethic through
the voting of taxes and the making of membership or eleemosynary
contributions to a host of' community enterprises. "In a society of
12. Id. at 361.
13. Id. at 364.
14. Id. at 368, 374.
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increasingly open opportunity, the ordinary citizen continues to find
life an effort, often a struggle, as he strives to advance in social status
and to match in achievement the aspirations he has absorbed."' 1
No intellectual snob himself, Rostow turns his back on the cliques
of those who lament the vulgarization of culture. Sharing Archibald
MacLeish's perception that Eve fell upward out of Eden, he finds
reasonable ground for hope that out of the cross-currents of the moment,
our educational system and our social life generally will continue to
progress, stage by uneven stage, toward a level of richness, maturity,
and freedom that was enjoyed a century ago only by the happy and
self-conscious few.
[TIhe forces making for a levelling down are strong, but the forces
making for a levelling up are stronger....
It is perverse puritanism to think that the modern advances of the
last hundred years will destroy our souls ....
The realization of social
goals that men have regarded for centuries as desirable can hardly be
considered the root of all modern evil. 16
With a book of such rich and varied content it is hazardous for the
reviewer to pick out particular concepts or arguments for challenge,
and the citing of any particular passage for dissent may seem to
readers of the whole book to be captious. Where broad dicta are set
forth, they are generally followed sooner or later by perspicacious
and realistic qualifications and exceptions-which often true up the
original generalization but now and then puzzle the serious reader
as to which horse Rostow is really riding. In the end, however, there
are three general issues as to which this reviewer feels moved to
enter a demurrer or at least note a caveat. They are so closely
interrelated as perhaps to be aspects of a single divergence rather
than distinct disagreements.
First comes the matter of what "control" means in the Rostow
vocabulary. I must confess that I grow restive as I encounter recurrent references to "legal control of the economy," "the American
economy as an instrument of the public law," "public control of business," "legal system for directing the economy," "goals for legal
action in controlling the economy," and the like. It seems to me needlessly to arm the dedicated enemies of the very concept of planning
to use so inflammatory a word-and needlessly to disarm actual
and potential friends of Planning for Freedom. Of course "control"
is a terse verbal symbol for a concept richly elaborated in the course
of the book. Many discriminating passages belie this word in any
authoritarian sense-as does the very title, Planningfor Freedom. But
quite a number of separate sentences could be quoted most damningly, out of context, by the still numerous partisans of rugged individu15. Id. at 381.
16. Id. at 382-84.
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alism or the "power corrupts" dictum of Lord Acton. In most if not all
such cases, I believe that if the passage had been made to read
"the conditioning of economic action" it would have been safer and
not unfaithful to Rostow's real meaning.
Second, it is perhaps only natural that one who is a law school dean
as well as an economist should feel that, in the marriage of law and
economics, the former should "wear the pants in the family." But
this reviewer would have found an "equal rights" or mutual complementarity doctrine more persuasive. To be sure, the law is not
portrayed as a crude and domineering master in Rostow's picture of
conjugal felicity in the economic order. But I believe more credit
should be given to the creative and leadership role of business or
what he calls "the market."
Here we have something of the oft-encountered chicken-and-egg
issue. Does law give birth to the economic order? Or does the economic order ovulate and incubate its own natural offspring in the
form of law? In my reading of economic history, experiment and
test of business practice have generally preceded evaluation and
formulation in law. Businessmen fashioned a novel kind of commercial and industrial joint enterprise and employed ad hoc devices
for limiting individual liability before corporation law took shape.
Work people operated unions and did a lot of collective bargaining
long before the Wagner Act. Bankers shaped and reshaped American
credit practices and pursued implicit or explicit monetary policies for
a century and more before Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act;
and the Treasury was a going concern in the field of fiscal practice
and inchoate fiscal policy long before the passage of the Employment
Act. In a book published some years ago, I examined The Legal Status
of Agricultural Cooperationin the perspective of "the evolution of our
business institutions [as] a long procession of experimental procedures
giving rise to de facto commercial forms which have in turn demanded
such recognition de jure as should make their position in the business
world both clear and safe." The book's opening chapter, "The Legal
Mold of an Economic Institution," foreshadowed the somewhat different emphasis I give in this hen-and-egg cycle than that given by
Rostow.
What he seems to me to be saying is that, in the on-going process
of our free economic order, we are now moving into a new cultural
stage, in which our training in, and apparatus for, social (including
economic) analysis and synthesis make it possible to substitute creative societary architecture and scientific human engineering, to an
important extent, for trial-and-error fumbling. This cultural mutation
should be recognized and welcomed for what it is-not overplayed.
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Both the positive and the negative aspect of this general proposition
should be recognized in the particular instance of the Employment
Act. It is well to remember: (1) that the act was passed by sweeping majorities because it acceptably reflected a concept of "planfulness" in economic affairs that had grown up in the practices of
business, labor, agricultural, and financial operations; and (2) that
the predecessor bill (Murray Full Employment bill), which proposed
to freeze a particular fiscal formula into law, was rejected by the
public and the Congress, and the measure which secured passage
was modulated to the key of eclectic flexibility and "the primacy of
the intellectual function" in policy making rather than control of the
economy by a fiscal and monetary kit of tools.
Third, and more technical, I would enter an exception (to be
argued in the higher court of Economic Theory) to Dean Rostow's
acceptance of and reliance upon the "aggregate demand" doctrinewith its obvious but discreditable paternity in the quantity theory of
money. The book's ascription of primacy to fiscal and monetary tools
for the control (or favorable conditioning) of the economic order
seems to me its major lapse from scientific virtue. I have registered
my own view elsewhere that "to an important extent both fiscal policy
and monetary policy are captives of market policy" in an economy of
administered prices and monopoloid wage "bargaining." This does
not mean that, as a veteran price-and-income economic specialist, I
would substitute one evaluative imbalance for another and claim
primacy for market institutions and policies in the ordering of our
democratic economy. Rather would I argue for the coordinate (or
neutral) ranking of public and private sectors of the total economic
process in that "integration" of theory-as-a-guide-for-policy which
Rostow hopes to find.
In many qualifying inserts or even single words, he suggests that
he sees this light or at least senses the direction from which it might
come. But he has been well sold on the dialectic of fiscal and monetary action as the "ultimate" solution of the problem of a successful
people's capitalism. In a way somewhat reminiscent of Melville's
immortal Billy Budd, Rostow's respect for "controls" armors him
against any temptation to lead or even participate in "the Keynes
Mutiny." Fortunately, there is no possibility that he, like his prototype, could fall a victim to this sort of clash-here between mechanistic determinism and the constructive use of discretionary power. He
will go on as a strong influence, making for "a happy ship," on which
both officers and crew exemplify the possibilities of planning for freedom.
In all probability, the demands this book makes on the reader
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for sustained attention and an open but challenging mind preclude
its attaining the "best seller" rating that a more flashy but less enlightening volume on "popular" economics occasionally enjoys. But
its careful reading should prove a valuable exercise for any professional lawyer, professional politician, or professional business
executive or labor leader-and for professional economists too.
EDWIN G. NOURSE"
* Author,

Economics in the Public Service (1953).

